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IN THE SUPBEME COUBT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J. P. KOCH, INC., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
J. C. PENNEY COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BBIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a suit to recover money allegedly owing for 
labor and material furnished pursuant to a construction 
contract. Suit was filed under the provisions of Section 
14-2-2 U.C.A., 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COUBT 
The court granted a Motion for Summary Judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant-
appellant J. C. Penney Company in the amount of $56,-
147.97 with interest from February 22, 1972 at the rate 
of six percent per annum until date of judgment, and 
thereafter at the rate of eight percent per annum. The 
lower court also entered an Order Conditionally Staying 
Enforcement of the Judgment. From such judgment and 
order defendant appeals. 
BELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment and a 
judgment in defendant's favor as a matter of law or in 
the alternative a mandate that the case should be tried. 
Defendant also seeks an order declaring the condition 
2 
Case No. 
13850 
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contained in the Order Staying Enforcement of the Judg-
ment to be void. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On about June 6, 1970, the defendant J . C. Penney 
Company entered into a contract with the defendant 
Skyline Construction Company for the erection of a store 
building in Bountiful, Utah. Skyline Construction Com-
pany was the general contractor for the project. On 
or about August 31, 1970, Skyline Construction Com-
pany entered into a subcontract with the plaintiff J . P . 
Koch, Inc., by the terms of which the plaintiff was to 
furnish materials and to perform labor incident to the 
general mechanical portion of the construction of the 
defendant Penney Company's building. The general 
contract, as originally signed, required that Skyline Con-
struction Company furnish a bond to guarantee payment 
of bills for labor and material furnished in the construc-
tion of the building. On or about September 18, 1970, 
the bond required was deleted from the general contract. 
In performance of the subcontract, plaintiff fur-
nished material and labor for the construction of the 
building of the defendant J . C. Penney Company of a 
reasonable value of $583,086.00. Upon completion of the 
contract, according to the books of the defendant Sky-
line Construction Company, there were backcharges or 
other lawful offsets against such amounts of material 
and labor in the sum of $2,160.64, leaving a net amount 
of $580,925.36. 
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In accordance with the provisions of the general 
contract between the defendant J. C. Penney Company 
and defendant Skyline Construction Company, progress 
payments were made by Penney Company to the general 
contractor from time to time as work progressed. In 
accordance with the contract and the general conditions 
thereof, payment requests were accompanied and sup-
ported by lien waivers from various subcontractors and 
materialmen, which waivers in most instances, showed 
the total amount of money received by each of the indi-
viduals (E.95-104). Under date of October 31, 1971, 
plaintiff furnished a lien waiver acknowledging receipt 
from the general contractor, on account of work per-
formed and material furnished of $569,608.34 (R.104). 
In reliance on the lien waivers so furnished, the defend-
ant J. C. Penney Company paid to the general contractor, 
Skyline Construction Company on account of the me-
chanical work performed the total sum of $569,608.34. 
The defendant J. C. Penney Company admitted in its 
answer on file herein that there remained due and ow-
ing the sum of $11,317.02 and paid such amount to the 
Clerk of the Court as a tender of all amounts owing. 
By its answer, the defendant Skyline Construction 
Company admitted that it owned to the plaintiff the sum 
of $56,147.97. Skyline Construction Company is now 
insolvent. 
The plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. At the hearing thereon, the depositions taken 
in the case were ordered opened and published. On 
November 29, 1973 the Court granted plaintiff's Motion 
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and entered a Partial Summary Judgment (R.30-32). 
Subsequent thereto and under the date of January 9, 
1974, and Court entered an Amended Partial Summary 
(R.26-28), in favor of the plaintiff and against the de-
fendant J. C. Penney Company in the amount of $56,-
147.97 plus interest thereon from February 29, 1972 at 
the rate of 6% per annum until entry of judgment and 
thereafter at the rate of 8% per annum (R.26). 
The Amended Partial Summary Judgment expressly 
finds that in reliance on the total figures in the lien 
waiver, defendant J. C. Penney Company "paid to de-
fendant Skyline Construction Company the sum of 
$569,608.34 shown on the last lien waiver upon which 
disbursement was made, which leaves due and owing 
from J. C. Penney Company to the plaintiff the sum of 
$11,317.02, exclusive of interest'' (R.27, par.7). 
The court further finds that the defendant J. C. 
Penney Company "could not justifiably rely on the lien 
waivers or the figures contained therein and said re-
liance is not a defense" (R. 28), and reserved for future 
determination the validity of the claimed backcharge. 
Under date of April 22, 1974, the defendant J. C. 
Penney Company filed a Motion to Stay the Enforce-
ment of the Judgment and upon hearing, the Court en-
tered an order conditionally staying the enforcement 
thereof (R.ll-12). The conditions were that interest on 
the judgment should run from June 6,1974 on the princi-
pal and then accrued interest: 
"at the current prime rate calculated by averag-
ing the daily rate for each month and that rate 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
will be applied for each month from June 6, 1974 
until the date of payment of any judgment award-
ed to the plaintiff" (R.ll) 
and that the defendant Penney Company pay to the 
plaintiff the sum of $11,317.02 together with interest at 
6% per annum, being the sum the defendant Penney 
Company had admitted was still owing and unpaid on 
the total subcontract. Subsequent to the entry of the said 
order, the defendant J. C. Penney Company did pay the 
sum of $11,317.02 together with interest as shown by the 
Partial Satisfaction of Judgment signed by the plain-
tiff's attorney (RIO). 
Subsequent thereto and under date of September 11, 
1974 the defendant J. C. Penney Company and the plain-
tiff settled and compromised the issue as to the claim of 
offset and all of the parties stipulated and agreed that 
the Amended Partial Summary Judgment should be 
declared to be and become a final judgment on the date 
an order was signed by the Court (R.7-8). Under date 
of September 11, 1974 the Court signed an order provid-
ing that as of the date thereof the Amended Partial Sum-
mary Judgment should be and become the final judg-
ment in the case. The defendant J. C. Penney Company 
thereupon filed Notice of Appeal. 
POINT I 
LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 14-2-2 
U.C.A., 1953 IS NOT ABSOLUTE 
The basis of plaintiff's suit is the liability imposed 
by Section 14-2-2 U.C.A., 1953 which provides as follows: 
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"Any person subject to the provisions of this 
chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good and 
sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein 
required, shall be personally liable to all persons 
who have furnished materials or performed labor 
under the contract for the reasonable value of 
such materials furnished or labor performed, not 
exceeding, however, in any case the prices agreed 
upon. Actions to recover on such liability shall 
be commenced within one year from the last date 
the last materials were furnished or the labor 
performed.' 
I t is clear in the plaintiff's Memorandum of Authori-
ties submitted to the lower court in support of the Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment that plaintiff's contention 
is that liability under this statute is absolute. The lower 
court appears to follow this argument since in para-
graph 8 of the Amended Part ial Summary Judgment 
(R.28) it is stated: 
"J . C. Penney could not justifiably rely on the 
lien waivers or the figures contained therein, and 
said reliance is not a defense to the claim of the 
plaintiff.'' (Emphasis added) 
The statute itself as quoted verbatim above does not 
appear to impose absolute liability and plaintiff has cited 
no cases from Utah or other jurisdictions so holding. 
This court has stated that decisions interpreting 
Section 14-2-2 U.C.A., 1953, known as the bonding statute, 
and Section 38-1-3 U.C.A., 1953, known as the lien statute, 
deal with the same or similar rights and, therefore, 
cases decided under one statute are applicable in deter-
mining the application of the other. The first such de-
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cision was Rio Grande Lumber Company vs. Darke, 50 
U. 114, 167 P.241. This was an attack on the constitu-
tionality of the statute imposing liability on the owner 
for failure to require a completion bond. (Now Section 
14-2-2 U.C.A., 1953.) The court held that the statute was 
constitutional and stated at page 124 Utah reports: 
"The statute of Utah now under review is auxil-
iary to our mechanics' lien law and just as much 
in aid of it as if it had been made a part of it and 
incorporated in the same chapter . . . under the 
bond statute, he (the owner) must take care to 
exact the bond and under the lien statute, he must 
take care to hold the fund." (Parenthetical phrase 
added.) 
In King Brothers, Inc. vs. Utah Dry Kilne Company, 
13 U.2d 339, 374 P.2d 254 it was stated: 
"Because of the common purposes of these lien 
and contractors' bond statutes and their practic-
ally identical language, adjudications as to what 
is lienable under the former are helpful in deter-
mining the proper application of the latter." 
To the same effect, see also Crane Company v. Utah 
Motor Park, Inc., 8 U.2d 413, 335 P.2d 837. 
Keeping in mind then the applicability of cases de-
cided under the materialmen's and mechanics' lien sta-
tute to the bonding statutes, there are a number of de-
cisions of this court. Factual situations similar to the 
present case have been considered on several occasions. 
In Zions First National Bank v. Reginald L. Saxton, 
et al., 27 U.2d 76, 493 P.2d 602, the owner, defendant 
Saxton, obtained a loan from plaintiff to do certain con-
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struction on a five acre tract of land. Shortly thereafter 
the owner advised the contractor that construction was 
to be expanded to include a twenty acre tract. As work 
progressed, the owner and the contractor, as an induce-
ment to plaintiff to advance funds, executed a certificate 
that the labor and materials were used in the construc-
tion. Upon receiving checks, they endorsed the same 
below language stating that they waived and released all 
lien rights. The contractor claims a lien on the original 
five acre tract and also on the additional fifteen acres. 
In deciding the matter, the Court cited Holbrook v. 
Webster's Inc., as controlling and said: 
"In signing a lien waiver Hamilton waived all 
liens for the work done, and it matters not that 
unknown to the plaintiff bank some of the work 
for which money was received was performed on 
the 15-acre tract." 
In Holbrook v. Webster's, Inc., 7 U.2d 148, 360 P.2d 
661, the contractor had signed a request for funds di-
rected to a lender and on the same document was a re-
ceipt and lien release which recited that it was delivered 
to the lender to induce it to make payment of the stated 
sum and that the materialmen waived, released and dis-
charged any lien or right to lien that he then had or may 
thereafter acquire against the real property described 
in the document. This Court stated: 
"We are of the opinion that no genuine issue of 
fact is presented by the lien release. The only 
issue is one of law. It does not lie in the mouth 
of appellant to say that he was mistaken in the 
legal effect of the release or that he did not in-
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tend that it should be given the only legal effect 
of which it is susceptible." 
The supplier had filed an affidavit stating that the re-
lease was only intended to release the property so far 
as the receipted amount is concerned. Going on the court 
said, 
"The release is susceptible of only one meaning 
and absent fraud cannot be varied except by 
agreement of the parties." 
A summary judgment entered below denying the ma-
terialmen a lien right was affirmed. 
In West v. Pinkston, 44 U. 123, 138 P. 1152, plaintiff 
entered into a subcontract to do brick work on a dwelling 
house and after completion of the work the general con-
tractor delivered* his personal check to the plaintiff for 
the agreed price. Plaintiff delivered a receipt for pay-
ment so that the contractor could obtain the money due 
the owner on the contract price. Thereafter, the con-
tractor delivered the receipt to the owner and relying 
on the receipt and the contractor's representation that 
he had paid the plaintiff, the owner paid the contractor. 
The contractor failed to deposit the check from the owner 
and refused to pay the same or any part thereof to the 
plaintiff. Suit was brought to foreclose a lien against 
the property. In deciding that plaintiff was entitled to 
no relief, the court said at page 129 Ut. Rep: 
"Appellant (plaintiff) therefore clearly authori-
zed as well as induced the respondent to pay the 
contractor the $850.00 which, but for the receipt of 
appellant, she undoubtedly would have paid to 
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him. After having induced respondent to pay the 
money, we cannot see how appellant can complain. 
In legal effect, she paid the money as directed by 
him, and he must look to the contractor and not 
to her for the same. Respondent thereafter had 
a right to deal with all others who had any claim 
upon her as though appellant w a^s out of the case." 
Going on the Court said: 
"We remark that this conclusion is based upon 
the undisputed facts that the appellant issued 
the receipt to the contractor with the understand-
ing and for the purpose that he should use the 
same to obtain the money due to appellant as 
subcontractor from the respondent; that it was 
fully understood between the appellant and the 
contractor that the latter had no money in the 
bank to pay the check, but that such money had 
to be obtained from the respondent; and that the 
receipt was to be used as a means to obtain the 
money. Upon these facts, we think the appellant 
is clearly estopped from making any further 
claims against the respondent under the statute." 
The Court quoted an early Missouri case, Cote, etc., 
Brick Co. v. Sadring, 68 Mo. App. 15: 
"A material man, who executes a receipt of pay-
ment in full to the contractor for material fur-
nished for a building, for which he sues the owner, 
who honestly and without any negligence on their 
part paid the contractor upon the faith of such 
receipt, is estopped from saying that the acknow-
ledgment of payment is untrue." 
Although West v. Pinkston is an old case, it appears 
from Shepherd's Citator not to have been overruled or 
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modified and is still the law in the State of Utah. 
I t has, in fact, been specifically held by this Court 
that liability under Section 14-2-2 is not absolute. In 
Apex Lumber Company v. Commanche Construction 
Company, 18 U.2d 119, 417 P.2d 131, in affirming a judg-
ment of no cause of action in favor of the property 
owners, the Court said: 
"Apex urges that (1) the evidence shows Apex 
supplied material for which it was not wholly 
paid. Apex is right, but this is not controlling, 
since such an argument would insure it against 
any nonpayment which it itself help to produce, 
as was the case here. Further it says (2) that 
under the statute it has a cause of action for the 
unpaid value of the material. Equally this is true, 
unless it was particeps in creating a defense for 
its opponents, as was the case here." 
In plaintiff's memorandum in support of the sum-
mary judgment, the statement is made that the bond was 
deleted, "without the knowledge of J. P. Koch, Inc." This 
statement seems to imply that Penney Company should 
have notified Koch of the deletion. I t is respectfully sub-
mitted that under the factual situation herein set forth, 
plaintiff is in no position to complain of the absence of 
the bond. The court's attention is respectfully directed 
to the final paragraph of Section 14-2-1 U.C.A., 1953: 
"The bond herein provided shall be exhibited to 
any person interested, upon request." 
I t is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff had an 
obligation on its part to ascertain that in fact a bond had 
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been secured as required by the contract, and that it was 
sufficient in form and amount. 
The defense raised by Penney Company is based on 
the fact that the conduct of the plaintiff itself resulted 
in plaintiff's loss. Such defense would be equally valid 
and available to a bond surety. See Chicago Bridge and 
Iron Company v. Reliance Insurance Company, 46 111. 
2d 522, 264 N.E.2d 134, wherein it was held that a sub-
contractor who executed waivers of liens without receiv-
ing payment from the general contractor would not be 
allowed to recover on a bond against a non-consenting 
surety. To the same effect is Crane Company v. Parker 
Construction Company (Mass) 247 N.E.2d 591, where 
the Court held that a supplier's agent who gave a heating 
subcontractor a certificate to the effect that he had been 
paid for boilers furnished was estopped from asserting 
a claim against the general contractor and the surety that 
he had not been paid since the general contractor relied 
upon the certificate to its detriment, and the general con-
tractor obtained payment for the amount of the boilers. 
This was the holding notwithstanding the fact that the 
subcontractor's check representing payment for the boil-
ers was subsequently dishonored. The Court went on to 
say that the contractor had no duty to make certain that 
checks had been honored before relying on the certificate 
of the supplier. 
I t is respectfully submitted that the law in the State 
of Utah is clear that where a subcontractor or supplier 
executes and delivers to the general contractor a lien 
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waiver knowing that the owner will rely thereon in mak-
ing payments to the general contractor, the signer of the 
lien waivers is estopped thereafter to claim a lien or to 
contend that he has not been paid the amounts shown in 
such lien waiver. This estoppel operates to barr a cause 
of action under Section 14-2-2 U.C.A., 1953. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT WAS JUSTIFIED IN 
RELYING ON THE LIEN WAIVERS 
The record shows that the general contract contained 
a detailed plan for making progress payments, and that 
this plan was followed (Peterson deposition, ps 5-8). 
Under this plan, payment requests were submitted per-
iodically by the general contractor. These requests show 
the percentage of completion for the various trade cate-
gories, the amount previously paid on each account, and 
the amount claimed as presently being due. Payment 
requests were supported by lien waivers from each of 
the subcontractors in the various trade categories. The 
amount on each lien waiver was to at least equal the 
amount paid on the previous payment request. 
Plaintiff was aware of this requirement. In his 
deposition, Gordon Neiderhauser, co-owner of the plain-
tiff corporation, said he knew that the lien waivers were 
required, to support the payment requests, and also that 
defendant Penney Company would rely on the waivers 
in making disbursements to the general contractor. (Nei-
derhauser deposition, p.14, line 25 through p.15, line 13.) 
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Mr. Neiderhauser identified the lien waivers sub-
mitted (R. 95-104) as having been signed by him. He 
further testified that some of the figures written on the 
lien waivers were in his handwriting and some were not. 
He could not recall in all instances whether or not the 
figures had been filled in at the time he signed the lien 
waivers. He freely admitted that in some instances sign-
ed waivers were left with Skyline Construction without 
dollar figures filled in, stating that "I assumed that 
Penney's or Skyline would put in the amount based on 
their estimate or my estimate to them". (Neiderhauser 
deposition p.15, line 11). Although he had a copy of the 
estimate of the value of work completed, he did not take 
it with him or consult it in filling in any of the amounts 
on the lien waivers, but simply relied on Skyline to fill 
in the correct amounts (Deposition, p.16). 
Charles D. Peterson, the architect on the project, 
was asked about the lien waivers submitted. At page 41 
of his deposition is a series of questions regarding the 
accuracy of lien waivers. The witness stated that : 
"Every single time I receive a lien waiver and it 
states on there that an amount of money has been 
paid, I have always believed that that was a true 
representation of the monies that had actually 
been paid by the general contractor to the sub." 
Further on the same page the witness stated that he was 
not aware that any of the lien waivers were a misrepre-
sentation of the facts. He was not aware that Skyline 
had required subcontractors to submit lien waivers in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
advance of payment. On the following page the witness 
stated that he was not aware that this was a common 
practice in the construction industry, and that he could 
not believe that it was. 
It is clear from Peterson's deposition that he had 
no way of knowing what amounts had actually been paid 
by the contractor from each construction advance to the 
various subcontractors. Of necessity he relied on the 
amounts shown as having been received in the lien waiv-
ers submitted by each subcontractor. This is not an un-
reasonable assumption or reliance. The subcontractors 
were in the best position to know what funds they had 
received from the general contractor on the job at any 
given time. 
In oral argument and in the Memorandum in Sup-
port of the Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff 
relies heavily on the fact that there was a discrepancy in 
the figures contained in two of the lien waivers, Exhibits 
7 and 8 (B.101-102). Peterson testified that upon receipt 
of the lien waiver, Exhibit 8, with a lower figure than 
for the previous month, he mentioned this fact to Penneys 
(Deposition p.30, lines 19-25; p.40 lines 1-14). 
On the foregoing state of the record, the court erred 
in three respects in holding that the defendant Penney 
Company was not justified in relying on the lien waivers. 
1. Plaintiff admits, at least for the purpose of the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, that Penney Company 
paid to the general contractor $569,608.34 on account of 
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the mechanical subcontract. This is the precise amount 
of the last lien waiver (R.104). Reliance on the figures 
contained therein is obvious. The court, in fact, found 
in its Memorandum Decision that, in fact, Penney had 
relied on the lien waivers. 
Plaintiff represented by the lien waivers that a spe-
cific sum of money had been paid on account of work 
done. At the time the waivers were furnished, plaintiff 
knew that the defendant Penney Company would rely on 
the amounts shown therein as paid in making progress 
payments to the general contractor. 
Notwithstanding these facts, the plaintiff not only 
made no effort to see that the amounts shown were cor-
rect and accurate, but left these amounts blank to be 
filled in by the general contractor. Having this con-
stituted, the general contractor, its agent to complete 
the figures, the plaintiff should be estopped to deny the 
correctness of such figures. 
2. The discrepancy in the figures shown on Exhibits 
7 and 8, as mentioned above, occurred in August, 1971. 
The last lien waiver was submitted in October of that 
year. During September a waiver was submitted and 
payment received, and following that the October waiver 
payment requests were submitted, and payment was 
made. 
The lower court apparently held, as a matter of law 
that because two of the lien waivers submitted, in a series 
of ten, over a period of eight months contained incon-
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sistent figures, none of the lien waivers could be relied 
upon. It is respectfully submitted that such finding, 
particularly when it is on a Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, is not proper or supported by the evidence. 
3. The judgment of the lower court on this matter 
was based on the record as presented, the pleadings, An-
swers to Interrogatories and depositions. On the ques-
tion of the reasonableness of defendant Penney Com-
pany's reliance on the lien waivers, the defendant had 
no opportunity to present evidence. This is a factual ques-
tion: Was the reliance reasonable? The trial court de-
termined such question in the negative, without affording 
Penney Company an opportunity to present evidence to 
the contrary. 
It is respectfully submitted that such determination 
on a Motion for Summary Judgment under the circum-
stances set forth above, was erroneous, and at the very 
least, the matter should be remanded for a trial. 
POINT III 
THE FIRST CONDITION CONTAINED 
IN THE ORDER STAYING ENFORCEMENT 
OF JUDGMENT IS VOID 
On July 22, 1972, the Court entered an Order Con-
ditionally Staying Enforcement of the Judgment upon 
two conditions (R.ll). The first condition was: 
"That in the event judgment is finally awarded to 
the plaintiff, interest thereon shall run on the un-
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paid balance at 6% from May 26,1972 until Janu-
ary 9, 1974, and from said date at 8% per annum 
until June 6, 1974 and thereafter on the principal 
and then accrued interest at the current prime 
rate calculated by averaging the daily rate for 
each month, and that rate will be applied for each 
month from June 6, 1974 until the date of pay-
ment of any judgment awarded to the plaintiff." 
The second condition was that the defendant pay to the 
plaintiff the sum of $11,317.02 with interest. This con-
dition has been met as shown in the Statement of Facts 
herein. Since the defendant J. C. Penney Company al-
ways admitted that this amount was owing, such con-
dition is not objectionable. 
Section 15-1-4 U.C.A., 1953 provides as follows: 
"Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract 
shall conform thereto and shall bear the interest 
agreed upon by the parties, which shall be speci-
fied in the judgment; other judgments shall bear 
interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum." 
Under the provisions of this statute, the court was 
without power or authority to direct that a judgment 
should bear interest at any other than the statutory 8% 
per annum. Speaking of interest on judgments, this 
Court said in Dairy Distributors, Inc. v. Local Union No. 
976, Joint Council 67, Western Conference of Teamsters, 
16 U.2d 85, 386 P.2d 47, "this interest follows the judg-
ment as a matter of law and would be collectable even 
though the judgment did not so provide". 
In 45 Am. Jur . 2d at p. 67 it is stated: 
"The rate of interest on judgments generally is 
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prescribed by statute. Such a provision is con-
trolling and the rate prescribed cannot be reduced 
by reason of equitable considerations". Geier v. 
Tjaden (N.D.) 84 NW.2d 582 and Carter v. Mc-
Haney (Tex. Civ. App.) 373 SE. 2d 82. 
Also cited in support of the statement that interest may 
not be reduced by reason of equitable considerations, is 
Kaufman v. Kaufman, 292 Ky. 351, 166 SW. 2d 860, 144 
ALR 866. In that case a statute provided that a judg-
ment shall bear legal interest from its date. The legal 
rate at that time by statute was 6% per annum. The 
lower court took judicial notice that interest rates in the 
commercial world had greatly decreased and even 2% 
was regarded as a good yield. It then construed the sta-
tute as expressing a legislative intent to limit interest 
on judgments to a maximum 6% and make a less rate 
legal interest. In a memorandum decision the lower 
court held it inequitable that Court obligations should 
carry a rate of interest altogether out of proportion to 
the earning of money generally. On appeal the court 
held: 
"The statute is too plain and definite we think 
to afford the interpretation that it but declares 
a maximum rate of interest . . . Although the 
judgment in this particular seems fair and just 
under existing conditions, economically speaking, 
we are constrained to hold the Chancellor was 
without authority to provide other than that the 
judgment should bear 6% interest." 
Not only did the lower court provide for a floating 
rate of interest, but provided for compound interest by 
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stating that after June 6, 1974 interest shall run "on the 
principal and then accrued interest". 
As stated in 45 Am.Jur.2d, p.71: 
"Although compound interest generally is not al-
lowable on a judgment, it is established that a 
judgment bears interest on the whole amount 
from its date, even though the amount is in part 
made up of interest. . . " 
In Dezen v. Slater off, (Fla.) 65 S.2d 484 the court 
said: 
"The principal sum, that is, the amount of the 
initial judgment . . . is not disputed, but interest 
is. The court evidentially allowed interest com-
pounded yearly. This was error. The plaintiff 
was entitled to simple interest only." 
Also, in North Drive-Inn Theater Corporation v. 
Park Drive-Inn Theater, Inc., et ah, (10th CR, 1957) 248 
F.2d 232 it is stated: 
"It is the general rule that a judgment bears in-
terest on the whole amount thereof, although such 
amount is made up partly of interest on the origi-
nal obligation and even though the interest is 
separately stated in the judgment." 
As stated in Johnson v. Hazen, 333 Mass. 636, 132 
NE.2d391,54ALR2d810: 
"A judgment bears interest from its date, al-
though the amount of the judgment in part is 
made up of interest." 
If the rule is as stated in Kaufman v. Kaufman, 
supra, that interest may not be reduced below that speci-
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fied by statute, the converse should likewise be true that 
interest may not be increased. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that the trial court was without authority or 
jurisdiction to increase the interest above the statutory 
rate. 
Even were this not the case, it is submitted that the 
provision for interest "at the current prime rate calcu-
lated by averaging the daily rate for each month" is 
impossible of computation. The judgment is silent as 
to what is meant by current prime rate, and it is a mat-
ter of common knowledge and, therefore, within judicial 
notice that the prime rate charged by banks in the eastern 
United States is frequently, if not always, different 
than the prime rate charged by local banks, and the judg-
ment offers no guideline or formula by which this in-
terest may be arrived at for the purpose of calculation. 
It is respectfully submitted that the first condition 
in the order staying enforcement of the judgment is void. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the District Court should be re-
versed and judgment entered in favor of defendant-ap-
pellant J. C. Penney Company. Liability under Section 
14-2-2 U.C.A., 1953 is not absolute, and the cases clearly 
hold that one claiming under such statute is barred from 
recovery if his own conduct is relied upon and causes 
the loss in question. 
The finding of the lower court that defendant-ap-
pellant J. C. Penney Company could not justifiably rely 
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on the lien waivers submitted, should be vacated as be-
ing unsupported by the evidence and as having been 
made without the opportunity for the defendant-appell-
ant to present evidence. 
The condition attached to the Order Staying Execu-
tion of the Judgment, which provides for interest at 
more than the rate set forth in the statute, Section 15-
1-4 U.C.A., 1953, should be declared to be void as being 
in excess of the jurisdiction and power of the District 
Court. 
In the alternative, this matter should be remanded to 
the District Court with directions that the same should be 
tried. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALLACE D. HURD 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
1011 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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